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Abstract  
This research examines fraudulent reporting behavior in accounting context. It evaluates the impacts of internal 
control strength toward fraudulent reporting with the involvement of internal control framing.  Internal control 
has been widely accepted as framework of fraud prevention. Nevertheless, internal control strength has 
inconsistently created unfavorable result in preventing fraud. Strengthened internal control is not always 
associated with lower fraud. This inconsistency addressed the existance of another variable that might mediate 
the relationship between internal control and fraudulent reporting. Internal control framing is predicted as a 
variable that may influence fraudulent reporting. Therefore, this research is aimed to observe the effect of 
internal control framing as the factor that comes from company towards the employee’s tendency of committing 
fraud. The 2 x 2 x 10 design experiment consists of 49 participants in experiment group and 11 participants in 
control group. A laboratory experiment with real rewards was conducted and analyzed using repeated measures 
ANOVA. Inconsistent with the previous research which mentioned the influence of interaction between internal 
control strength and framing towards fraudulent reporting, this research found the significant influence of 
framing toward fraudulent reporting is more than the influence of weak or strong internal control.     
Keywords: Fraudulent reporting, Internal control strength, Framing coordinating, Framing monitoring 
 
1. Background 
Fraudulent reporting is believed as one of the most major cause of accounting scandal. In these couple of years, 
the issues identified with misrepresentation in money related reporting still get to be a standout among the most 
attentiveness toward numerous organizations (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2011). In view of Carpenter and 
Reimers (2005), fraudulent reporting is a deliberate demonstration to beguile others by intentionally distorting 
occasions, exchanges, and/or other imperative data for individual and/or hierarchical additions. In this way as the 
anticipating activities to relieve the likelihood of false reporting, associations are concentrating on internal 
controls. According to several auditing literature, regulatory actions, and professional auditing standards, 
stronger controls reduce fraudulent reporting (AICPA, 2002; Bell and Carcello, 2000; COSO, 1999; Loebbecke 
et al., 1989; PCAOB, 2007). It concentrates on how internal control turns into the quality to compel the 
misrepresentation. By and by, a few inquiries about clarify that internal control alone is insufficient to avoid 
misrepresentation. 
Internal Control has been undoubtedly admitted to be the predictive factor for fraudulent reporting. 
Companies keep focusing on how to establish better Internal Control because it has been in mind that Internal 
Control is significantly related on the tendency of people committing fraud. However, the recent research found 
that Internal Control could also result in unwanted actions, precisely fraudulent reporting. One of the examples is 
the fraudulent financial reporting found at Royal Ahold and New Century Financial Corporation in response 
strong internal control reflected in the budget pressure (Knapp, 2010). On the contrary to auditing standards, 
strengthening controls could create unintended consequences that even encourage employees to do actions that 
result in negative effects to the firm (Falk and Kosfeld, 2006; Hannan et al. 2006; Rankin et al., 2008; Tayler and 
Bloomfield, 2011). It is a dilemma where the existence Internal Control cannot be compromised as the power to 
fight against the fraud.  
Research done by Liu, et al. (2014) became the first in explaining a new factor that influences on how 
Internal Control could be well implemented yet without resulting in negative side effect to the company. The 
research investigated fraud prevention and business ethics by examining the interactive effects of Internal 
Control and the firm’s communicated control purpose / control frame on managers’ propensity to engage in 
unethical fraudulent reporting. This research found that framing influenced the way control strength brings 
impact to fraudulent reporting. As internal control is framed for monitoring purpose, stronger internal control 
results in less fraudulent reporting than weaker internal control. Conversely, when internal control is framed for 
coordinating purposes, stronger internal controls result in more fraudulent reporting than weaker controls (Liu, et 
al., 2014). Framing mediates the relationship between internal control and fraudulent reporting. The research 
also emphasized on how the company should not only focus on preparing the control strength, but also on how to 
deliver it to employee trough framing. 
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2. Literature Review 
2.1 Framing  
Yates (1990) portrays the term encircling as alluding to ''varieties in the presentation of a choice circumstance 
such that the decision making develops notably diverse representations of that circumstance.'' In easier words, 
framing is a varied communication of information to create a certain mindset to the audience. Tversky and 
Kahneman (1986) reported a distinction in choices made when the circumstance was displayed to decision 
makers in various frames (loss versus gain) which is upheld by the Prospect Theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 
1992). Simon and Hayes (1976) discovered comparative impacts in problem (Kahneman, 2003). Framing 
impacts are not restricted to decision making. What makes a particular framing unique to another is ''the way in 
which the choice problem is presented in accordance with the norms, propensities, and desires of the decision 
making'' (Tversky and Kahneman, 1986). 
The way in which information is framed affecting individual perceptions and judgments (Christ et al. 
2012; Emby 1994; Emby and Finley 1997; Frisch 1993; Levin et al. 1998; Loroz 2007). Based on the objective, 
there are two ways framing being communicated, which are for monitoring purposes and for coordinating 
purposes. Monitoring and coordination have been viewed as two distinct and independent mechanisms 
companies may employ to direct employee behaviors toward achieving organizational goals (Roth and Nigh 
1992; Marsden et al. 1994). Internal control with coordinating purposes frame the control’s objective as to to 
improve coordination among functional departments or managers to achieve positive results for both the firm 
and managers (Christ 2012; Edmunds et al. 2010; Garrison et al. 2011; Nicolaou et al. 2011; Roth and Nigh 
1992). While in monitoring framing, the existance of internal control is to monitor behavior or outcomes. 
Monitoring framing might result in less fraudulent reporting since the manager is awared of being monitored 
Firm implement a budgetary control that establishes limits for various cost items for each department. 
Costs exceeding the maximum limits cannot be reimbursed to the department without additional approvals. This 
budgetary limit can be framed as a monitoring control mechanism in that it assists the firm in evaluating the 
actions of the department in terms of its spending and ensuring that departmental spending are within acceptable 
limits (Barrett and Fraser, 1977). Alternatively, the same budgetary limit can be framed as a coordinating control 
mechanism in that it provides relevant information to top management regarding potential areas in which 
corporate resources can be better allocated to improve overall firm performance and to coordinate functional 
managers’ activities to achieve a target profit (Barrett and Fraser, 1977).  
 
2.2 Fraudulent Financial Reporting  
Fraudulent reporting is defined as the disclosure of financial statements involving accounting irregularities to the 
public so as to deceive them into perceiving the firm’s financial health in a more positive light than it actually is 
(Brief et al., 1996; Carpenter and Reimers 2005; Kaplan et al. 2009). Accounting irregularities, such as to 
‘‘generate an inflated earnings report,’’ involve ‘‘hidden action’’ (Crocker and Slemrod 2007). The public is 
unaware of the fraudulent accounting until the time they are exposed.  
According to (AICPA 2002), fraud is a deliberate intentional act that outcomes in a material 
misstatement in financial statements. Misappropriation of asset and fraudulent financial reporting are types of 
fraud in private sector.  According to Shana (2014), there are two parties who could trigger in committing fraud. 
It could be employee committing the unauthorized use of company assets for personal benefit (Wells 2008) or 
the corporate fraudulent financial reporting by manipulating financial performance to appear better. In contrast, 
employee fraud benefits the individual at the expense of the organization (Albrecht 2011. Accounting 
researchers have primarily focused their efforts on corporate understanding fraudulent financial reporting rather 
than employee fraud (Coram 2008; Mustafa and Meier 2006) yet survey evidence over the last decade indicates 
that employee fraud is the most common (Albrecht et al. 2011; ACFE 2012; KPMG 2009; PwC 2011). 
 
2.3 Internal Control 
According to ISA 315 (2012), Internal Control is extensively characterized as a procedure, designed to provide 
reasonable assurance regarding the accomplishment of operation's effectiveness and efficiency, financial 
reporting reliability, and compliance with appropriate laws and regulations. It addresses an entity's business 
objectives, which are performance, profitability goals, and safeguarding of resources. In addition, internal 
control supports the preparation of reliable financial statements. Internal control also deals with company’s 
complience with laws and regulations. These particular yet overlapping objectives address diverse needs and 
permit a guided center to meet the different needs. 
ISA 315 (2012) requires external auditors to make inquiries of the internal audit function to evaluate 
and assess risks of material misstatement. Auditors may refer to the management’s responses of the identified 
deficiencies of the internal controls and determine appropriately.  Besides inquiries of the internal audit function, 
auditors may collect audit evidence of the control environment through observation on how the employees 
perform their duties, inspection of the documents, and analytical procedures.  After obtaining the audit evidence 
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting                                                                                                                                    www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online) 
Vol.7, No.12, 2016 
 
3 
of the control environment, auditors may then assess the risks of material misstatement. Other factors that 
influence internal control are the risk assessment, information and communication, control activities, control 
monitoring, and control to fraudulent reporting.whether the management has taken appropriate actions to tackle 
the problems  
The effect of internal controls on managers’ propensity to engage in fraudulent reporting is dependent 
upon control strength (Hannan et al. 2006; Tayler and Bloomfield 2011). Ceteris paribus, weaker controls are 
less likely to prevent managers’ fraudulent reporting behavior than stronger controls. However, prior economics, 
management, and management accounting literatures provide evidence challenging the notion that stronger 
controls necessarily lead to a lower likelihood of fraudulent reporting (Christ et al. 2008; Falk and Kosfeld 2006). 
This stream of literature finds that implementing formal controls has unintended consequences that may not 
reduce or even may induce managers’ self-interested behavior that is detrimental to the firm (Falk and Kosfeld 
2006; Hannan 2006; Rankin 2008).  
The effectiveness of implementing stronger controls increases when the firm communicates that 
controls are implemented for coordinative (monitoring) purposes. Furthermore, a mediated moderation analysis 
suggests that rationalization mediates the interactive effect of control strength and control framing on fraudulent 
reporting. Inconsistency between the firm’s choice in the strength of controls and control frame reduces the 
efficacy of the implemented control to curb fraudulent reporting. Specifically, stronger control communicated for 
coordinating purposes increases managers’ propensity to engage in fraudulent reporting. Consistent with prior 
literature (e.g., Kramer 1999; Rowe 2004; Tayler and Bloomfield 2011), the inconsistent signals between a 
firm’s actions and communicated message focuses managers’ attention on their own self-interest, thus resulting 
in greater fraudulent reporting. 
H1 : Coordinating (Monitoring) framing positively (negatively) impact the Fraudulent Reporting. 
 
3. Research Methodology  
The respondents are undergraduates Accounting students who will be treated as the experiment design. This 
primary data will be in the form of financial report showing the level of fraudulent reporting. Sixty business 
students are playing role as managers of division who will give their reports to the corporate headquarter. The 
instructor will be the corporate headquarter. One more independent person will be finance division who is charge 
in money inflow and outflow. Payroll division should be the one who don’t know the purpose of the experiment. 
The division manager and the headquarter know that the reality that the cost is uncertain. The job flow is that 
corporate headquarter will announce that each division manager should report the cost of each product sold. The 
selling price of the product is $6 each. The term “$” here means experimental dollar. While the cost ranges from 
$4 until $6. After the manager submits the budget request to the payroll, he will receive money as much as the 
budget.  Then the money would be exchanged into gifts proved based on the point they get during the 
experiment. 
Two-way Repeated Measures ANOVA is appropriate for measuring the relationship between two 
independent variables to the dependent experiment in repeated periods (Field, 2012). The two independents 
variables will be manipulated to the respondents to see the result of dependent variables. The 2 x 2 x 10 ANOVA 
model is used with Internal Control and Framing as the between-subjects variables and Periods as the within 
subjects (repeated measures) variable. Internal Control itself will be divided into two categories, the weak 
Internal Control and the strong Internal Control.  
The experiment is set to the managers that they face a dilemma whether they want to maximize their 
own wealth or to focus for company profit. They can easily keep the excess from the difference between the 
actual cost and the fake cost set by them. To apply the Internal Control, for the strong Internal Control, the 
minimum income is $2 while for weaker Internal Control is $2.5. In the monitoring frame condition, participants 
were told to help the firm more closely monitor project managers’ reports in order to prevent project managers 
from gaining at the expense of the firm. This control procedure limits project managers from overstating project 
costs and thereby maximizes firm profits.  
In the coordinating frame conditions, participants are told that the firm’s newly implemented control 
procedure is to help the firm better allocate resources among projects to achieve corporate strategies which 
benefits both the firm and project managers. The benefits are received by project managers as reflected in a 
profit sharing arrangement based on firm profits. Managers are faced with dilemma to maximize wealth for 
themselves by causing loss to company or to report honestly. That is, the more the manager lies, the more he 
earns, and the less he lies, the less he earns. Thus, the experiment provides a direct test of the relation between 
monetary incentives to lie and reporting behavior. Because the manager knows the actual cost for certain when 
making his cost report. 
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4. Results 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Variable 
Variable N Min Max Mean Std. Deviation Variance 
Fraud 49 .30 1.00 .8478 .21452 .046
Valid N (list 
wise) 
49
     
Fraudulent reporting across the 10 period of reporting. The experiment was participated by 60 students 
where each students have 10 periods of reporting, meaning there are 600 possibilities of committing fraudulent 
reporting. There are 170 out of 600 reports were fraudulently reported. The level of fraudulent reporting is 
therefore 28% from the experiment. 
Table 2. Result of Experiment 
Group Members (N) Reports Collected Dishonest Reports 
Coordinating High 13 130 53 
Coordinating Low 13 130 37 
Monitoring High 11 110 8 
Monitoring Low 12 120 25 
Control 11 110 46 
The table 2 shows the list of respondents based on their group. First group consist of 13 members where 
each of them collect 10 reports therefore the total reports are 130. There are 53 dishonest reports out of 130 
reports. Second group consist of 13 members where each of them collect 10 reports therefore the total reports are 
130. There are 37 dishonest reports out of 130 reports. Third group consist of 11 members where each of them 
collect 10 reports therefore the total reports are 110. There are 8 dishonest reports out of 110 reports. Fourth 
group consist of 12 members where each of them collect 25 reports therefore the total reports are 120. There are 
25 dishonest reports out of 120 reports. Fifth group consist of 11 members where each of them collect 10 reports 
therefore the total reports are 110. There are 46 dishonest reports out of 130 reports. 
Figure 1. Results of Experiments 
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                                                                                       Periods 
Table 3. Each Group Average Level of Fraud 
Group 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Average* 
Coordinating Strong 0.0% 15.4% 51.3% 35.9% 24.9% 25.8% 30.1% 33.3% 37.2% 42.3% 30% 
Coordinating Weak 14.3% 15.4% 24.6% 13.1% 16.6% 14.9% 4.95% 4.6% 10.3% 10.9% 13% 
Monitoring Strong 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 18.2% 9.1% 9.1% 9.09% 9.1% 9.1% 9.1% 7% 
Monitoring Weak 0.0% 12.5% 10.0% 11.0% 6.7% 11.5% 12.5% 10.8% 8.1% 13.9% 10% 
Control 7.3% 27.3% 23.9% 23.1% 17.7% 20.1% 16.0% 38.6% 10.7% 25.3% 21% 
Table 3 explains the detail number of Figure 1. The figure shows interesting result where during first 
periods, the tendency of committing fraud is still low for each group. Then, the fraudulent level is getting higher 
and diversifies in the next periods. However, in the last periods, the level of fraudulent reporting tends to be low 
again. This may be caused by the tendency of people where they tend to learn the condition of company and try 
Level of fraud 
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to look good at the first impression. Then, their real intentions will appear in the next time. Finally as the last 
time they are about to leave, the will try to look good again. This gap can be consideration for the next research. 
Figure 2. Interaction between Fraud and Internal Control 
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
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35%
Weak Strong
Coordinating
Monitoring
 
Internal Control 
Figure 2 shows the interaction between the framing used in the company and the Internal Control of the 
company to the level of fraudulent within the company. The coordinating purpose (blue line) shows positive 
interaction with the level of the Internal Control. The level of fraudulent reporting is 13% when the Internal 
Control is weak. Then, the level of fraudulent reporting is 30% when the Internal Control is strong. Here we can 
conclude that as the level of Internal Control is stronger, the level of fraudulent reporting will also increase as 
well. Conversely, the monitoring purpose (purple line) shows negative interaction with the level of the Internal 
Control. The level of fraudulent reporting is 10 % when the Internal Control is weak. Then, the level of 
fraudulent reporting is 7% when the Internal Control is strong. Here we can conclude that as the level of Internal 
Control is stronger, the level of fraudulent reporting will decrease.  
Figure 2 gave an insight that the level of internal control strength is not influencing fraudulent reporting. 
In fact, framing on internal control is more influencing. When the employee to be framed as internal control is 
directed for coordinating purposes, it will not be as effective as even weak internal control framed by 
monotoring framing purposes. Framing is more influencing since it give a mental blocked towards the employee 
on how they perceive on the sistem. To reduce fraudulent reporting, the entity is better to use monitoring framing 
on internal control.  
 
4. Hypothesis Testing 
4.1 Two-way Repeated Measures ANOVA 
Table 4 shows the result of testing for the first hypothesis (H1) which states that Framing has a 
significant effect on fraudulent reporting is partially accepted. Table shows that the P value of framing is 0.03, it 
means the effect of framing significantly influences over the fraudulent reporting. However, the relationship 
between Framing and Internal Control is not significant toward Fraudulent Reporting. The result also gives 
additional information where in fact, the Internal Control itself does not impact significantly toward fraud. 
Table 4. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Measure: Fraud  
Source Type III Sum of 
Squares 
Df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Intercept 10.920 1 10.920 26.615 .000 
Strength .593 1 .593 1.446 .236 
Framing 2.049 1 2.049 4.994 .030 
Strength * Framing 1.076 1 1.076 2.622 .112 
Error 18.463 45 .410   
Framing 
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Table 5. Tests of Within-Subjects Effects for Fraud Measurement 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares 
Df 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Periods 
Sphericity Assumed 1.177 9 0.131 2.268 0.017 
Greenhouse-Geisser 1.177 6.001 0.196 2.268 0.037 
Huynh-Feldt 1.177 7.489 0.157 2.268 0.026 
Lower-bound 1.177 1 1.177 2.268 0.139 
Periods  * Strength 
Sphericity Assumed 0.723 9 0.08 1.393 0.189 
Greenhouse-Geisser 0.723 6.001 0.121 1.393 0.217 
Huynh-Feldt 0.723 7.489 0.097 1.393 0.203 
Lower-bound 0.723 1 0.723 1.393 0.244 
Periods  * Framing 
Sphericity Assumed 0.726 9 0.081 1.398 0.187 
Greenhouse-Geisser 0.726 6.001 0.121 1.398 0.216 
Huynh-Feldt 0.726 7.489 0.097 1.398 0.201 
Lower-bound 0.726 1 0.726 1.398 0.243 
Periods  *  Strength   
*  Framing 
Sphericity Assumed 0.652 9 0.072 1.257 0.259 
Greenhouse-Geisser 0.652 6.001 0.109 1.257 0.278 
Huynh-Feldt 0.652 7.489 0.087 1.257 0.268 
Lower-bound 0.652 1 0.652 1.257 0.268 
Error(Periods) 
Sphericity Assumed 23.362 405 0.058     
Greenhouse-Geisser 23.362 270.061 0.087     
Huynh-Feldt 23.362 337.011 0.069     
Lower-bound 23.362 45 0.519     
Table 5 indicates that Period significantly impact toward the Fraud. It can be interpreted where the 
duration or length in periodicity of Financial Report impact the tendency in doing fraud. However, the 
interaction between Period, Framing, and Strength does not significantly impact toward fraud.  
 
5. Conclusions and Recommendations 
The result of the research gave a new perceptive to companies in preventing unwanted actions. Internal Control 
that is primarily and broadly accepted as preventive actions towards fraudulent reporting, in fact cannot stand 
alone. Internal Control acts as the rules and regulations that technically control the operations within companies 
to prevent any fraud and misappropriation of assets. However, the technical alone is not enough. The research 
shows that how companies deliver the Internal Control to the companies is the next big thing to consider 
regardless how well the Internal Control within that company. Managers should also emphasize on how they 
deliver the messages related on why rules and regulations are set so in order to establish the perceptions between 
the employees and the managers the same. The research even shows that impact of framing is bigger than the 
level of Internal Control regardless how weak or strong the Internal Control, the existence of Framing should be 
focused.  
The second result shown in the research is that Love of Money initially observed to see the impact of 
internal factor from the employees is not significant toward the tendency in committing fraud. Here we could say 
that the impact of Framing that comes from the companies has bigger influence that the internal factor from the 
employees. Previous research done by Tang (1992) used questionnaires based in measuring the interaction 
between Love of Money towards unethical behaviors. The result shows that there is positive correlation between 
Love of Money and unethical behaviors. However, in this research that uses experimental based or in the other 
words, actions based shows that how people may commit in unethical behaviors are caused by the situations 
within companies. The factor from internal does not give much impact in encouraging people to do.  
For the future improvement, the next researchers may concern on other factor that influence the level of 
fraudulent reporting. Framing is the significant factor that comes from the company. Other aspects that come 
from the individuals may be consideration. Secondly, the next researcher may use employees that already have 
working experiences to be the respondents in order to give more clear explanations. More samples used will be 
better. Thirdly, interesting result could be shown when the researchers use respondents across nations to see how 
each individual coming from totally different backgrounds perceive the Internal Control.  This research was done 
to Indonesian students. In order to add the possible variables that could impact the tendency in committing fraud 
would give better explanation, even more if those variables related to culture or moral reasoning that are 
different in across nations.  
The management should not only focus on how to implement control strength to reduce the fraudulent 
financial reports. Management should also the framing, so the message will be properly received by the 
employees. The lecturers of business students can concern to emphasize the importance in teaching ethics to the 
students. Educating is not just about the intelligence and skill but also the character development. The framing 
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can be taught since in college to, so that the students will understand the importance of ethics and the reason why 
rules and regulations are strictly made. 
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